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* * * * * * * 
P: ―It was my Ph.D. defence on Friday, I start a new job on Monday‖ 
E: ―Where?‖ 
P: ―Kennispark.  At Maser Engineering, a little engineering business‖ 
Overheard Conversation, Prinses Wilhelmina FC, 1 October 2011 
INTRODUCTION 
The quotation that opens the paper was part of a conversation in which one of the authors was 
involved immediately before the STEPI conference in Seoul, and it is something of which 
urban policy-makers claim to pursue.  The idea of a high-technology district, the Twente 
Knowledge Park (Kennispark) has passed from being seen as a project towards an 
unselfconscious name of an urban district.  Just as residents of Enschede no longer connect 
the ―Wooldrik‖ district with the eponymous textiles dynasty, so there seems to be a 
suggestion that the Kennispark has left a real mark on the way residents conceive of the 
functioning of the city.  The high-technology space appears to have become a knowledge-
based place, suggesting that a functional connection to the rest of the city and the fulfilment of 
policy-makers desire to change the way that the region of Twente operates through this new 
district. 
The remainder of the paper ultimately serves to explore why it matters whether a new 
knowledge district, the Kennispark, becomes integrated into the city of Enschede.  The 
Kennispark is a project which emerged at the end of the 20
th
 century as an idea to create a 
new district – within a city but serving a higher regional function.  Since then, there have been 
ongoing efforts from a range of stakeholders to fully realise this idea.  What we seek to do in 
this paper is to ask the questin of have those attempts been successful?  Can we find evidence 
that this new knowledge district has become more than a science park, but has indeed taken 
on these wider regional functions.  Through an analysis of Chambers of Commerce data as 
well as a survey of Kennispark companies we are able to provide a suggestive answer to this 
question. 
But there is the wider question of why would those two questions be scientifically interesting, 
in short why does it matter whether local authorities are able to create new urban districts 
based on knowledge production which fulfil a higher regional function.  This rationale derives 
from three distinct tendencies which we see in the literature. The first is that there is a 
widespread recognition of the ubiquity of the knowledge economy, and the increasing reliance 
of general economic prosperity on place specific capacity to innovate (cf. Temple, 1998 for an 
overview; also Perry & May, 2008).  The second is that there has been in the last two decades 
a resurgence of the importance of the region as a critical scale for innovation activity (Hardill 
et al., 2006).  The third is that there has been an attempt by policy-makers to recognise the 
first two of these tendencies with the increasing ubiquity of regional innovation policy as a 
focus for action (OECD, 2010). 
In this paper, we follow May & Perry (2010) and Benneworth et al. (2011) in arguing that 
there is an implicit urbanity in many of these models of regional innovation policy.  The rise 
of the popularity amongst policy-makers of Richard Florida‘s Rise of the Creative Classes 
(2002) has seen a policy-focus on cities as attractors and anchors for the necessary human 
resources for effective innovation.  But the problem with the way these innovation policies 
have emerged is that they have taken a very simplistic, and one-dimensional view of the city.  
So in what Perry & May (2008) call ‗Knowledge-based urban development‖ theories, there is 
a possibility to look in quite an nuanced way in the ways in which investments in science, 
technology and innovation interact with the production of urban spaces.  Yet, there has been a 
tendency for the assumption of a kind of naïve ‗urban science‘ in which primacy is given to 
the drivers and logic of knowledge-based economic development. 
In this paper, we want to open up the space for a more rigorous discussion of Perry & May‘s 
concept of knowledge-based urban development (KBUD), and in particular to focus on the 
urban elements of those processes.  In particular we focus on the role of new knowledge-
based districts in the overall composition and development dynamics of the city.  We argue 
that this perspective has been fundamentally overlooked or simplified to a question of 
supportiveness.  We therefore explore the potential for an explicitly urban dimension to 
KBUD, and in particular focus on the issue of ‗capital functions‘, that is the higher-order 
functions played by a particular district as indicative of successful integration of knowledge 
spaces.  This provides a theoretical framework to explore whether the Kennispark has indeed 
become a successful new knowledge district, and shed some light on whether the rise of urban 
science does indeed represent a forward step in understanding the spatial as well as the 
economic currents of the new knowledge society. 
THE IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY POLICY 
In this paper, we are interested in the challenges and problems raised by contemporary 
attempts to make sense of innovation and the knowledge economy.  We point to a growing 
consensus that cities are key nodes in the knowledge economy, and managing cities as space 
for knowledge activity creates new opportunities for urban development trajectories.  There 
has been an upscaling of policy ambitions concerning innovative spaces from the level of the 
building or block, the incubator and the science park, to the level of the city, to knowledge-
based districts, and even some cities which have claimed to become ‗Science Cities‘, 
apparently purging from memory the disaster that was Academgorodok. 
The emergent ‘fit’ of science-based policies to economic development trajectories 
But what has been interesting about these plans for new urban science policies is their 
conception of the city.  There is almost a naïve, ‗happy families‘ (Lagendijk & Oïnas, 2005), 
approach within strategic urban management, that assumes that flagship science projects will 
help regenerate and rebuild cities in more competitive ways.  But we are concerned, as the 
twentieth anniversary approaches of the seminal Quintas et al. (1992) paper ‗High technology 
fantasies‖, of a recurrence of this problem.  Quintas et al. found that pace science parks 
adding to urban competitiveness, science parks were only successful in places that already 
had dynamic, knowledge-based economies (such as Cambridge in the UK).  The high-
technology nature of science parks blinded policy-makers to the shortcomings of the 
approach, leading to misplaced investments in ‗science parks‘ that became little more than 
factory units near to universities or research laboratories.  Are the high-technology allures of 
science policy running the risk of repeating those problems with science park policy in the 
1980s? 
The answer to that question is of course emergent, and it is possible to point to a number of 
exemplar regions which did use science parks as a sensible part of a regional development 
strategy focused on creating new economic development trajectories.  Arenberg Science Park 
in Leuven, whilst modelled (explicitly) on Research Triangle Park in Durham, North 
Carolina, did form an anchor point for a technology development policy including IMEC 
which drove a ‗technological revolution‘ in Flanders (larosse, 2004). Likewise, in Tampere, 
Finland, traditional rivalry with Oulu might have motivated the Tampere science park, but its 
clever exploitation by the city government helped build four recognised national centres of 
excellence (Sotarauta, 2006).  In Scania, political pressure was central in creating the IDEON 
science park, originally anchored around Ericsson‘s mobile telephony division, but which 
later evolved into a high-technology innovative ecosystem with strengths in functional foods 
and biotech as well as ICT and engineering (Benneworth et al., 2009). 
The issue here is that what these three examples all demonstrate is areas where the idea of a 
science park fitted with a wider set of industrial transformations supported by deliberate 
industrial policy.  The focus for policy was not specifically around the creation of a science 
park, rather the creation of the science park was one thread in an attempt to build new kinds of 
industries which both fitted with the regional strengths, making the science parks more than 
‗Silicon Somewheres‘ (cf. Hospers, 2006). Our argument is that what is missing is regarding 
these knowledge-based urban developments from the perspective of the city.   
Just as the successful examples of science park policies ‗fitted‘ on some level with the 
switching regional industry trajectory (Benneworth et al., 2007), we argue that we would 
expect to find, with successful KBUD strategies, some kind of fit with the wider urban 
regional development trajectory.  To do that, we firstly consider the riser of regional 
innovation policy and then the parallel urban management approach, strategic urban 
management, to identify potential areas of synergy.  From that we identify a set of wicked 
issues for strategic urban management, and alight on one of these, urban morphology as a 
relatively straightforward issue to address.  We then explore whether it is possible to align 
those divergent sets of interests in practice, and create an urban science policy that contributes 
to the urban as well as knowledge-based development activities. 
Regional innovation policy. 
If the moment of consensus on the validity of an idea is the moment before the bubble bursts, 
then those involved in knowledge-based urban development projects should be starting to 
worry.  There is an all-pervasive consensus that in an age of knowledge-based economic 
development focused on competitive creative cities, the scientific campus or knowledge park 
will be as important to urban competitiveness as was the market-place to the medieval city.  
Perry & May sum up this consensus neatly as the phenomenon of knowledge-based urban 
development:- 
―a dominant consensus [which] has emerged around the need to increase the inter-
relationships between universities and their localities for the mutual benefit of all 
involved … cities and city-regions are adopting a number of strategies and policies 
designed to build science cities, knowledge capitals, silicon alleys or technology 
corridors‖ (Perry & May, 2010, p. 6) 
The extent with which these notions of KBUD (what we refer to as ‗urban science‘ in 
Benneworth et al. (2011)) are being developed, advocated and implemented makes the task of 
a critical reflection on its value vital.  We argue that urban science in its many forms have to 
be understood as the latest incarnation of territorial innovation models (Moulaert & Sekia, 
2003; Lagendijk, 2006), which is itself part of a wider shift in territorial economics towards 
neo-endogenous approaches to economic development (Bradshaw & Blakely, 1999).  In the 
question of what makes territories attractive to investment and supportive of endogenous 
growth, the answer has shifted from factors of production towards dynamic, learning-driven 
supply chains, clusters of production, to innovation and innovative ecologies (cf. Morgan, 
1997, Lagendijk, 1999, Rutten, 2002; Bathelt et al., 2004; Wolfe et al. 2009; OECD 2011). 
We would not pace Lovering (1999) seek to argue that neo-endogenous approaches to 
regional economic development are misplaced.  There is a clear rationality behind the 
increasing importance of innovation, and the city or region as the scale for that activity, and 
hence its promoting policy.  The central feature of the knowledge economy is that knowledge 
capital determines productivity alongside the traditional factors of land, machinery and labour 
power.  But unlike the others, knowledge capital is embodied in people, and created and 
transmitted via interactive, social processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1996; Wenger, 1998).  
These social processes are not purely functional, relating to the purposive transmission of 
knowledge for economic ends, but become interwoven in people‘s lives. 
A key process for knowledge based economic development is the operation of spill-over 
processes.  Rather than having to create all necessary knowledge de novo, knowledge can be 
created by accessing, appropriating and building on existing knowledge capital.  What has 
been known now for over a decade is that the ‗region‘ is a natural space within which spill-
over functions efficiently (Lorenz, 1999; Lawson, 1999, Longhi, 1999).  Regions become 
home to ‗pools‘ of highly skilled labour that help to stimulate innovation in other companies 
(Storper, 1995), even when it is not in those corporations‘ economic interest to do so, and 
indeed corporations may work strategically to limit the benefits that regions may enjoy from 
their presence .  The problem is that regions and the regional cultures that promote innovation 
are not instrumental and easily controlled or manipulable  (Oosterlynck, 2007) 
Strategic urban management practice 
Our contention is that this simplification has emerged because of the rise of the paradigm of 
strategic urban management, which specifically downplays the difficulties in managing 
partnerships to effectively co-operate in regional economic development.  Strategic urban 
management is part of a wider trend in the provision of public services towards what Rhodes 
(1997) called governance in networks, and away from government in hierarchies.  The key 
lines of force of this new paradigm, the so-called ‗new public management‘, place the accent 
on harnessing the dynamic power of markets to solve complex societal problems (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Ackoff, 1999).  The aim is to stimulate efficiency in the provision of public services,  
with public agencies (government) setting goals and achieving strategic integration where 
there are possible areas of market failure  (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
In the field of science funding, new public management has been characterised by the rise of 
competitive funding approaches (competition) in parallel with programmatisation and theme 
setting (co-ordination).  Universities have faced competition for students and quality 
frameworks have been introduced to allow direct steering of teaching programmes from the 
centre.  But the new public management has also been introduced in urban policy, involving a 
redefinition of the role of the state away from the direct provision of services and towards a 
smart mobilisation of regional partners towards common goals.  The challenge for cities is 
that they are increasingly regarded as nodes in wider global production networks, and 
therefore their success or competitiveness depends on attracting particular higher order 
functions that position them more strongly in what Smith (2003) calls these ―world-city actor 
networks‖. 
Kresl (2005) has highlighted how this has seen a response towards a range of cities 
responding to these by shifting from an interest in urban management in the round, towards a 
more specific focus on achieving urban competitiveness.  This has been marked by a shift 
towards developing economic development strategies in which city councils are no longer the 
exclusive deliverer of services, although often funding and subsidising desired actions by 
others towards collectively agreed goals. But there is always a tension between the role of the 
city authority as an urban manager, and its role as a strategic innovation animateur.  Science 
city approaches only ever cover a limited range of the interests of local authorities, and 
partnerships may agree activities or priorities which do not necessarily make sense from a 
wider public policy perspective.   
There is a question over for whom is the city, and in particular how far should a city authority 
seek to attract potential ‗highly talented‘ future residents at the cost of resources which are not 
then spent on existing residents (Moulaert et al., 2000; Oosterlynck et al., 2011).  Universities 
in particular can have strong private interests in science city developments which affect the 
resources they hold (particularly the value of their land) without necessarily paying directly 
back for the services and infrastructures which provide that value (Goddard, 2009).   
The issue is not that these developments are in some way bad, rather that the decisions around 
spending on infrastructure and developing these new locations are often rather more 
politically complex than a simple urban strategy approach might suggest. The issue is one of 
strategic fit, and in particular whether the particular proposal ‗fits‘ with both the science base 
and the urban development trajectory of the city under consideration.  By ignoring that 
question of fit, which relates to particular concrete realities rather than to a simplistic 
conceptual answer, ―urban science‖ as a policy approach creates a set of potential problems, 
or wicked issues, that are all too often overlooked and which undermine exploring the wider 
geographies of urban science. 
WICKED ISSUES 
What has become evident more recently is the trend towards the incorporation, often 
uncritically and without reflection of the city into the idea of the region.  The idea is not 
without merit as the form of city emerged as a critical meeting place where markets came 
together.  Likewise, it is well recognised that cities and universities have co-evolved, with 
universities vital in providing the highly skilled workers necessary to allow (fairly) 
functioning markets (Bender, 1988).  With the rise of the popularity of Florida‘s (2002) 
creative cities thesis, there has been a simple elision between cities as foci for regions, and 
regions as spaces of innovation.  The OECD (2011) have identified the ingredients that 
contribute to the recipe for a successful ‗science city‘, and highlight the degree of different 
national contexts within which science cities are currently being developed and implemented 
with often substantial resource commitments (see the table below).   
 But placing urban science in this lineage of neo-endogenous development provides a stark 
reminder of the limits of the policy applications of these models.  We have already 
experienced two waves of ‗policy bubble‘ in these third wave neo-endogenous models.  The 
1980s enthusiasm for science parks was tempered by findings that science parks tended to be 
beneficiaries rather than creators of territorial economic advantage (Massey et al., 1992).  
Likewise, 1990s enthusiasm for clusters sparked by Porter‘s (1990) bestseller was tempered 
by a realisation that whatever clusters were, they were not a policy panacea (Martin & Sunley, 
2003).  Indeed, there was a wider concern that the enthusiasm of policy-makers for those 
ideas had come at the expense of their intellectual rigour (Lovering, 1999, but see Landabaso, 
1999 for a rebuttal of that point). 
Of course the lessons of these episodes is not that these original ideas or analyses were in 
some way flawed. Rather there was a valid critique in that somehow these notions became 
caught between a consensus of the ‗correctness‘ of the idea and policy momentum (Lagendijk 
& Cornford, 2000), producing an irrational exuberance which detracts from understanding 
particular situations and responding to problems.  There is a risk in simplistically assuming 
that universities, cities and their regions will always work straightforwardly together towards 
common regional aims (Christopherson & Clark, 2010). These partners have a wide range of 
interests – short-term and long-term, opportunistic and principled – and holding these interests 
together is vital for successfully delivering urban science projects and meeting partners‘ 
interests through these projects (Benneworth et al., 2011). 
Returning to the issue of ‗strategic fit‘, we wish to focus this paper on the wicked issue that 
arises between the different desires that partners in urban science have in achieving their 
goals, and the different framings of those activities.  Table 1 (below) from Benneworth et al. 
(2011) shows the differing kinds of interests which partners in urban science may have in a 
particular project, and adds a row indicating their vision of success. 
Table 1. Different actors and their goals/ interests in strategic urban science 
Actor  Goals/ interests Indicators of success 
Regional 
government 
Successful projects; legitimacy, 
electoral success 
A flagship new district that attracts 
highly talented individuals  
Universities Research infrastructure, research 
income 
New buildings which help them to 
attract talented faculty/ students 
Community 
groups 
Regeneration, better local facilities ‗Footfall‘: bringing people into local 
area raising public service demands  
Residents Improved employment in emerging 
sectors 
All the benefits and none of the costs 
of a knowledge workers districts 
Real estate 
firms  
Profitable rental locations, 
development opportunities 
Density within the developed area as 
indicator of prestige 
High tech 
firms 
Competitive locations with skill-base. Ease of access to support services via 
prestigious address 
Source after Benneworth et al. (2011) 
So in this paper we ask three research questions to understand the issue of strategic fit in 
urban science:- 
 Can these different interests be strategically fitted together within an urban science 
project?   
 Is it possible for these different actors with their interests in their coalition to find their 
own values in urban science projects?   
 Can those prestige interests and indicators be fitted into the reality of planning and 
developing a physical location, and supporting innovative businesses to be more 
competitive in their diverse global markets? 
METHOD & OVERVIEW 
In this research, we present results from three sources, which we have triangulated to produce 
a synthetic narrative which comes some way to answer our research questions.  The reality is 
that this case study fits with an ongoing programme of work into Kennispark and the regional 
economic impact of the University of Twente.  We approach the problem from a critical 
realist perspective: we construct a narrative of reality which we use to test our research 
problems; we acknowledge that there are limitations to the reality which can be revealed 
through case study work, but a triangulation of evidence allows something meaningful to be 
said about the nature of ‗reality‘.  This is not strictly speaking a case study in the sense of Yin 
which has been selected on the grounds of its structure to fit the needs of testing a theoretical 
question.  The structure of our approach is that the case study appears to be an interesting 
example of a theoretical phenomenon, and by examining that phenomenon we gain insight 
into the architecture of the theory. 
The theoretical process with which we are concerned in the paper is the attempt to deliver 
urban strategic management through ‗urban science‘, namely creating new knowledge 
districts in an attempt to create or improve a novel urban function that improves the overall 
competitiveness of that city.  Our operationalisation of this issue into a research question is to 
look at the extent to which the Kennispark district functions as an integrated knowledge 
district as a central location for knowledge spill-overs.  To gain an insight into this, we have 
sought to understand the composition of the firms located on the Kennispark, and the extent to 
which they have a regional locus to their innovation.   
The first element of data gathering came from the Chambers of Commerce firm database.  
Providing data to this register is legally demanded for all companies located in the East of the 
Netherlands, and provides a time-lagged and restricted data set of basic information on 
companies.  The information is based on the basis of legal entities which do not necessarily 
correspond to real activities. The data includes numbers of employees, turnover and primary 
and secondary business sectors.  The main value of this database is in understanding the 
nature of the whole Kennispark business population, and interpreting the more detailed  
business survey subsequently undertaken.  The register reported a total of 433 firms located 
on the postcodes corresponding to the Kennispark area. 
The second element of data gathering came from a short questionnaire to all firms on 
Kennispark for which an email address could be found.  Of the 433 companies, it was 
possible to find email contacts for 234. We sent an web-based survey to all and received 
responses from 67. Of those, 52 were valid questionnaires and are used in the subsequent 
analysis, giving an overall response rate is approximately 22%.  The survey included seven 
main question areas which sought to explore the nature of the business, its key resource 
dependencies and reasons for location at the Kennispark, and the extent of the regionalisation 
of its innovation processes.   
The questionnaire was necessarily briefer than might have been necessary, but our prior 
interviews (qv) had revealed that because of the nature of Kennispark as an innovation and 
entrepreneurship policy experiment (qv) means that key respondents are continually 
approached and surveyed by local and foreign research teams, necessitating a short inquiry. 
The innovation questions were derived from the Community Innovation Survey and sought to 
identify the extent to which there were patterns of ‗creative location behaviour‘ suggestive of 
the emergence of a new knowledge district. As we are especially interested in the innovation 
dynamics between the UT and the companies located within the Kennispark, we asked 
specifically for the impact of the UT in each firm‘s recent introduced innovations. 
Finally, the research is framed by an understanding of the policies which have been employed 
in Kennispark, both currently and also historically in the genesis of the idea.  We therefore 
draw on other work within our ongoing research into Kennispark, which has been published 
elsewhere as inter alia Benneworth & Hospers (2007a, 2007) and Benneworth et al. (2011) 
but also within OECD (2007) and Garlick et al. (2006).  This work in turn draws on around 
eighty interviews with businesses, university representatives at a variety of levels and 
regional/ local policy makers, as well as detailed documentary analysis of a range of policy 
reports over the last twelve years.   
KENNISPARK AS A POLICY SPACE AND PHYSICAL SPACE 
Introduction to the Kennispark case study 
Although the phrase Kennispark first occurs in a policy document in the municipality in 1999, 
to understand why this occurred requires a slightly more historical perspective on economic 
change in the east of the Netherlands.  The region of Twente, shown in the map below, was 
chosen by King Willem II as the home for a new textiles industry after the loss of the southern 
Dutch (textile-led) provinces to the newly-formed kingdom of Belgium in 1839.  The industry 
was driven by three things, foreign technology (primarily from Manchester and the north west 
of England), Baptist and Jewish entrepreneurs and Royal patronage.  The textiles industry was 
a means of exploiting Dutch east Indian colonies as a source of cotton and a captive market.  
In the second half of the 19
th
 century, the industry flourished, and politicians and textile 
barons used part of their protection to provide wages and social services for their workers.  
When the three elements of the system fell apart after WWII (colonies, protectionism, wage 
competitiveness), the Twente textiles industry quickly suffered at the hands of competition 
from low wage countries. 
A university was immediately seen as a solution to these problems, and a grouping of regional 
magnates came together to form the Stichting tot bevordering van hoger technisch onderwijs 
in de noorderlijke en oosterlijke provincies, which despite its rather abstract name had the 
specific goal of lobbying for a new university for Twente to revitalise its industrial base.  The 
Dutch government created a second technical university in Eindhoven in 1950 in recognition 
of Philips‘ need for highly educated workers, and in 1959, a national competition for a third 
technical university was launched which culminated in the launch of the university in 1961.  
The university was located at the edge of the city of Enschede, close to the second regional 
city of Hengelo, on a country estate expropriated as enemy property after WWII.  The 
university‘s purpose was explicitly to revitalise the textiles industry complex which also 
included advanced engineering and machine building companies supporting the industries.  
However, the university was not able to reverse the steady decline of the sector, and by the 
mid-1970s, the sector was so shrunken that questions were raised in parliament concerning 
the utility of maintaining a technical university in a region without a technical industrial base. 
Figure 1 The location of the region of Twente in Europe. 
The response of the university was to reorient itself towards working directly towards the 
technical revival of Twente‘s industry.  In 1978, the university created a ―Transferpunt‖ as a 
single contact point for firms to access the university‘s knowledge base.  In 1982, prompted 
by a local newspaper article mentioning firms formed by university spin-offs, the university 
board commissioned research onto how the university could support spin-offs.  The report 
became the basis for the TOP programme (Temporary Entrepreneurs Scheme), launched in 
1984 which provided starting entrepreneurs with business advice, research contacts, a 
physical location and a subsidised loan (Van der Sijde et al., 2002a; 2002b).  The university 
also became involved in negotiations between the regional development agency, the 
municipality and the Computer Data Corporation to create a Business Technology Centre 
adjacent to the campus as an incubator avant la lettre for these spin-off firms.  In 1989, the 
success of the BTC led the municipality to create together with the university a Business and 
Science Park on the area to the south of the campus, where the BTC was located. 
The BTC was successful in its aim of incubating high-technology businesses, and the BSP 
began to attract new R&D investors seeking connections to the university (including for a 
time Ericsson R&D and Lucent Technologies), as well as providing a site for the growth of 
spin-up and start-up firms formed by university start-ups and graduates.  The BSP was created 
on the basis of a formal covenant between the university and the municipality of Enschede, 
which expired after a decade.  This technical issue drove the partners in the BSP to consider 
how the BSP could be further developed and so we see the record from 1999 showing that the 
BSP partners met and for the first time the idea of a Kennispark was mentioned, although 
without specifying precisely what this term meant.  Part of this success was because of the 
success of the university in creating companies through the TOP programme over a 15 year 
period. 
The evolution of the Kennispark idea and reality 
The idea was given further development in the following decade in response to three crises, 
each of which required partners to specify more clearly what was to be meant by the 
Kennispark idea.  The first crisis came in the early 2000s, in the wake of the high-technology 
crash, where university, municipality and businesses were severely hit by economic problems; 
the university‘s estate reached the end of its life requiring a mammoth rebuilding programme, 
the municipality faced the announced closure of a Dutch Air Force base employing around 
1,500 people locally, and the dot.com burst saw a large number of high-technology businesses 
fail, including the emblematical Ericsson R&D facility.  In response to this, regional partners 
assembled a strategic plan for regional growth, in which the Kennispark was to be one of the 
flagships for regional (and ideally national) investment.  In this, Kennispark became more 
precisely specified as a reorientation of the university and BSP as a single 20 ha high-
technology space that would become home to firms employing 10,000 people (see diagram 
below).   
Figure 2  The Kennispark concept at the time of the economic crisis, c. 2004 
 
The second crisis which emerged was a regional political crisis driven by a split in the region 
between rural and urban municipalities.  The reality was that Kennispark was in the context of 
a Dutch government seeking to promote high-technology economic development (Minez 
2004) the best opportunity for attracting national subsidies.  At the same time, rural 
municipalities could not see why they should have to invest their reserves in projects which 
were primarily of benefit for the urban regions.  There was a lengthy negotiation between the 
municipalities in the regional body in which the concession was made that Kennispark had to 
serve a genuinely regional function, and to represent more than a successful district in the 
city.  It is at this time in 2008 that Kennispark evolved to being a regional asset, with more 
emphasis placed on its wider regional benefits than purely for the host city of Enschede. 
The third crisis came in the period 2008-10 when the new district had to be fitted into the 
spatial plans of the city of Enschede.  Prior to that point, the spatial structure of the 
Kennispark had been purely imagined, so architects plans were drawn up on the basis of what 
made sense for Kennispark.  In this period, the ideas for Kennispark had to be fitted into the 
practical demands which the city placed on all developments within its boundaries in terms of 
suitability of development and servicing.  The university for the first time was brought into 
the control of the city‘s parking department and parking restrictions/ penalties were enforced 
from 2010.  The nature of the crisis was in seeking to remove the elevated motorway 
(‗Viaduct‘) that physically separated the two halves of Kennispark, there was resistance in 
both City councils of Enschede and Hengelo over the impact that this would have on the 
overall traffic circulation and commuting times for their respective residents. 
What is notable about this evolution of the idea of the Kennispark was its detachment from 
the reality of the businesses located within its border.  The idea began as an administrative 
vision of the extant business park, then evolving to take into account the interests of the 
municipalities.  Although municipalities are interested in the competitiveness of their 
businesses, they are not the only interests of municipalities, and it is clear that the evolution of 
the policy notion of Kennispark evolved quite differently from the reality.  The argument 
made by a number of respondents was that this policy evolution was necessary to build the 
required support for the investments which would then feed through to support business 
innovation.  In the next section we turn to consider the reality of the firms on the Kennispark, 
and whether there remained a fit between this reality and the vision of the new urban quarter 
which emerged through the prolonged negotiations and changes of direction. 
THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE KENNISPARK FIRMS 
In order to get an insight into the inhabitants of the Kennispark location, the Chamber of 
Commerce data was analysed.  The Kennispark location contains four main high-technology 
activities, the University of Twente (UT), the BTC (which has evolved into a business centre), 
an incubator unit (the so-called VentureLab Twente) and the business locations on the former 
BSP.  As was intended with the merger of the two locations, there are currently businesses 
physically located in the UT as part of the business accelerators, which are locations intended 
to support research valorisation and exploitation.  Within these four locations, there are a total 
of 433 organizations are legally established in postcodes which correspond to Kennispark. Of 
those, 165 are established in the UT campus while the BSP houses 268. The BTC alones is 
home to 46 companies and the VTL 11. 
However, these figures are slightly misleading because of the nature of what constitutes a 
legally established organization.  One of the side-effects of Twente‘s quarter-century of 
innovation activity has been a proliferation of ‗foundations‘, (like the original ―Stichting ter 
bevordering‖ and its successor the Universiteitfonds) to encourage co-operation, to meet the 
needs of European funding projects and to insulate marginal activities from damaging 
universities and businesses.  Of the 433 organizations, 105 are foundations; there are 91 sole-
traders (―ZZP-ers‖), 200 limited companies, 23 partnerships, 3 co-operatives and 2 joint stock 
companies, which act as olding companies for groups of trading activities, more common 
among the more well-established, larger high technology businesses. 
There 433 organisations account for a total of 6056 ftes employed at the Kennispark postcode 
locations.  That rather high number includes the 2657 employed at the time of writing at the 
University of Twente. Other significant employers include an accountants office and financial 
consultancy company (340), the chamber of commerce (190), lawyer company (143) and a 
civil law notary (120). There then follow the first of two technology-based companies: 
Universal electronics (103) and XSens (94).  The full employment distribution is shown in the 
figure below. 
Figure 3 Employment at Kennispark by no employees in firms. 
 
Source: authors’ own analysis of CoC data. 
What is most significant is that the most frequent category are companies with zero 
employees representing 32.6 % of all companies.  There are thus around 150 of these shell 
companies.  Of companies that actually employ people, there are one quarter (26.1%) of all 
firms that have only one employee, and companies with less than 5 employees account for 
15.5% of the Kennispark firms.  In total, 84.1% of Kennispark‘s companies have less than 10 
employees. 
Sectors of activity using two digit NACE coding show that financial service activities are the 
most active sector within the companies located in the Kennispark (17.8%, 77 companies). 
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities come next (12.0%, 52 companies) 
as well as Scientific research and development (6.9%, 30 companies).  We analysed the 
technology intensity of industries using the Eurostat three-digit classification, presented 
below:-  
Table 1 Technology intensity of Kennispark firms, no. of firms. 
Sector # % 
High technology  7 1.6 
Medium high-technology  3 0.6 
Low-medium technology 7 1.6 
Low-technology 6 1.2 
Knowledge based services 322 75.0% 
Less-knowledge based services  85 19.7% 
Source: authors’ own analysis of CoC data. 
INNOVATION ACTIVITIES 
The first contention was that greater interaction with the university of Twente would indicate 
Kennispark functioning as a a more regional and creative knowledge district. What is 
interesting is that despite the absence of firms in the high-technology sectors, including the 
total absence of firms in the pharmaceuticals industry, 72% of the surveyed companies 
reported innovations within the last year.  This represented 38 of the 52 respondents to the 
questionnaire.  The first subsequent question to this population of innovating companies was 
to ask them to highlight significant sources of knowledge in the innovation process.  What we 
see that is interesting is that after the usual sources of knowledge for innovation (internal and 
within the supply chain), the university were the fourth most source of high-intensity and 
medium-intensity knowledge use.  Thus, despite the apparent profile of Kennispark as a 
business park for knowledge-intensive business services, there appears to be evidence that the 
park is functioning at least in helping those firms access knowledge. 
Figure 4 Significant sources of knowledge reported by innovating firms 
 
(N=38) 
The second area where we looked at the role of the Kennispark was in terms of the publicly 
subsidised services provided by the services.  To understand their interaction with these 
services, we asked questions relating to both the regularity with which these services were 
needed by the innovating firms, and their frequency of usage of the services provided within 
Kennispark.  The list of services was derived from literature and cross-checked with the 
management of Kennispark to make sure that those services are in fact available within the 
park. The choice of Kennisvraag is a specific service offered on the Kennispark by which 
innovating firms with a knowledge demand can contact a specialist advisor who will help 
direct them to possible providers of answers to that question drawn from the university, 
polytechnic, consultant, business or student sectors. 
Figure 5 Reported need for innovation services provided by Kennispark  
 
Figure 6. Need for services (N=52) 
We then turned to look at given that demand for services, where were the areas where there 
was unexpectedly high or low use of those services.  Results show that recruitment of talent 
from the UT is the most needed service among companies located within the Kennispark. 
Office space, parking and eating facilities come next. Notably, needs for financial support, 
coaching, training and the commonly accepted services for start-up companies are ranked 
much lower.   
Figure 7 Reported use of innovation services provided by Kennispark  
 
(N=48) 
The table below shows the areas of greatest demand for and the use of those services provided 
on the Kennispark.  What the table indicates fairly unambiguously is that the two specific 
services are the use of talents and access to the laboratories, both of which reflect the 
particular research programmes and infrastructures that are present on the campus.  The other 
three variables are ‗placeless‘ in that they could be provided anywhere but the talent recruited 
by firms and the use of the laboratories are highly specific to the research groups at Twente. 
Table 2 The top five services demanded and used by Kennispark innovators 
Top 5 by demand % Top 5 by use  % 
Talent from UT  63% Talent from UT 52% 
Office Space  48% Parking 28% 
Parking Facilities  40% Office space 32% 
Eating facilities  40% Eating facilities 31% 
Access to Laboratories  26% Access to Laboratories 11% 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the CoC data highlights the dominance of the Kennispark population by high-
technology service companies.  In part this reflects the reality of the TOP programme, where 
aspirant entrepreneurs are pushed to develop a realistic business plan, including income 
generation. Selling high-technology services is a good way to generate cash flow but then 
forces a reliance on organic growth and even satisficing behaviour, reducing the potential for 
new high-growth business opportunities on the campus.  But these firms appear to have 
thrived, and the dominance by business service firms does seem to reflect a policy-aspiration, 
and indeed that policy-makers would not be disappointed if the 10,000 Kennispark jobs 
desired came entirely from knowledge-based services. 
At the same time these knowledge based service firms do appear to be different from jobbing 
consultancy firms in the sense of having a demand on university knowledge through the use 
of their laboratories and recruitment of their students.  Thus, these firms, even if formally 
active in NACE areas which suggest they are not really innovative are realising Harry van den 
Kroonenberg‘s desire from the 1970s to bring university knowledge to life, and make the 
university valued by its regional partners.  This suggests – if the sample results are replicated 
more widely amongst firms on Kennispark – that there is something unique and 
indeosyncratic about the Kennispark arrangement, as a district where the UT knowledge is 
valorised and region jobs are created. 
There remains a question as to whether the policy-makers, who have invested their emotions 
heavily in a sense that Kennispark will be a new regional knowledge district, will be satisfied 
by what appears to be either business as usual or a continuation of the direction of change.  
There is a sense that these small, organically growing consultancy farms are not the big 
answer to the regional economic problems that Kennispark has promised historically to its 
funders.  Despite delivering successes on some scale, there is still the risk that the cleavage 
between political vision and economic reality might diverge, particularly under the 
straightened economic circumstances within which the Netherlands now finds itself, and the 
withdrawal of the hydrocarbon funds (FES) from scientific activity from 2015.   
What does remain attractive to policy-makers is the allure of the university to create high-
technology business.  Both the Premier and Crown Prince visited the MESA+ laboratory, a 
key valorisation space within Kennispark, in the last year, and this helps to create national 
profile for local policy-makers of the way that suggests that are improving their regional 
competitiveness.  But of course the fame that accrues to a visit is only to the one or two 
Mayors who feature in the press photos, and not to the 12 other Mayors who may feel that 
Kennispark is reverting back to its urban, rather than regional role.  Thus Kennispark has 
finessed rather than addressed the fault lines, and the issue of strategic fit of policy vision and 
practical reality remains unaddressed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the Wicked Issues section, we raised three questions which we sought to address through 
this paper. 
 Can these different interests be strategically fitted together within an urban science 
project?   
 Is it possible for these different actors with their interests in their coalition to find their 
own values in urban science projects?   
 Can those prestige interests and indicators be fitted into the reality of planning and 
developing a physical location, and supporting innovative businesses to be more 
competitive in their diverse global markets? 
In response to the first of these questions, of whether the different interests can be 
strategically fitted together, is that we were struck by the dissonance of visions within a 
progressing project. There seems to have been a significant degree of strategic ambiguity, 
with very different partners believing they were working towards very different goals, which 
were not necessarily reconcilable at the end of that project.  What that has done is provide a 
degree of flexibility for the existing activities to develop and produce successes, without 
necessarily stipulating what those successes were in advance.  But of course, that strategic 
ambiguity comes at the expense of providing coherence and commitment, because there is no 
clear agreement about what project success would look like – Kennispark could have 10,000 
knowledge-intensive jobs by 2020 (the stated aim) and fundamentally disappoint a significant 
number of its stakeholders. 
The second question related to whether different partners could find their own value in the 
coalitions and resultant projects.  What is apparent in the Kennispark example was that the 
strategic ambiguity is at least in part a function of the ‗urban‘ nature of the project. Cities are 
complex and have many competing and complementary narratives, and we see that in 
Kennispark, as a knowledge district, partners seem to allow a higher degree of freedom and 
complexity than might be permitted for a science park.  In the BTC, for example, it was 
necessary to stipulate that a minimum of 90% of firms had to be high-technology to ensure 
the high-technology atmosphere of the incubator.   
By contrast, the defining lines of Kennispark are much looser, and yet that does not seem to 
prevent the accrual of high-technology narratives to it.  But then there is a need to reflect that 
urban complexity in the way that these science spaces are managed. Dormans (2008) reminds 
us of the need to ensure that the images and imageries that policy-makers choose for the cities 
have some concordance with the narratives by which the everyday workers live their lives. SO 
paradoxically, we see in P‘s unselfconscious statement at the start of this paper that he is 
working in Kennispark a sense that it has evolved from being special to a taken-for-granted, 
but at the same time its novelty is what is prized  by policy-makers in their own endeavours to 
secure wider urban competitiveness. 
It is these challenges of managing the sublime and the mundane in a single space, utilising its 
spatial strategic ambiguity and complexity to deliver the ordinary and the sensational, that 
provide an insight into the third question. Indeed it highlights quite neatly the challenges 
facing policy-makers in government, universities and public service more generally in 
managing their urban science projects to ensure they support overall urban complexity and 
development. 
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APPENDIX 1: RESULTS FROM INNOVATION SURVEY 
Sources of innovation are distributed as shown below 
Sources of Innovation Not 
used 
Low Medium High Mean S.D 
Internal 0 0 7 31 3,82 0,393 
Suppliers 6 5 16 11 2,84 1,027 
Clients 1 4 15 18 3,32 0,775 
Competitors 5 13 18 2 2,45 0,795 
Consultants 14 11 9 4 2,08 1,024 
University of Twente 9 8 11 10 2,58 1,13 
Conferences and trade fairs 10 10 14 4 2,32 0,989 
Scientific publications 11 8 11 8 2,42 1,13 
Professional associations 17 11 8 2 1,87 0,935 
N=38       
 
 
Need for Services No Below 
average 
Average Above 
average 
Muc
h 
Mean S.D 
Talent from the UT 6 4 9 17 16 3,63 1,31
4 
Kennispark events  5 17 24 5 1 2,62 0,86
7 
Financial support 14 13 15 7 3 2,46 1,19
6 
Entrepreneurial training 9 12 22 8 1 2,62 1,01
3 
Kennispark business development team 13 11 20 8 0 2,44 1,03
7 
Joint venture facilitation 15 16 11 8 2 2,35 1,17 
Kennisvraag (specific support measure 
from Kennispark) 
14 18 15 3 2 2,25 1,04
6 
Laboratories 25 7 7 7 6 2,27 1,47 
Coaching 11 7 23 10 1 2,67 1,08 
Eating facilities 7 4 20 17 4 3,13 1,12
1 
Parking 6 6 19 17 4 3,13 1,10
3 
Sport facilities 12 17 17 4 2 2,37 1,04
8 
Office space 5 4 18 17 8 3,37 1,13
8 
N=52        
 
 
Use of Services No Someti
mes 
Averag
e 
Freque
ntly 
Intense
ly 
Mean 
Talent from the UT 5 8 10 12 13 3,42 
Kennispark events  11 17 16 3 1 2,29 
Financial support 29 8 7 4 0 1,71 
Entrepreneurial training 24 17 5 1 1 1,71 
Kennispark business 
development team 
32 7 9 0 0 1,52 
Joint venture facilitation 33 12 2 0 1 1,42 
Kennisvraag (specific support 
measure from Kennispark) 
31 11 3 1 2 1,58 
Laboratories 33 5 5 3 2 1,67 
Coaching 25 12 9 1 1 1,77 
Eating facilities 4 14 15 14 1 2,88 
Parking 5 9 16 16 2 3,02 
Sport facilities 30 3 14 1 0 1,71 
Office space 12 5 16 10 5 2,81 
N=48       
 
